Marquette Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 2 1976 (Number 2)

Article 3

Civil Procedure
John R. Decker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
John R. Decker, Civil Procedure, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 279 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol59/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

TERM OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT
(AUGUST, 1974 - AUGUST, 1975)
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The most significant development in civil procedure law
during the August, 1974 Term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was the court's adoption of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure.' While the new rules will bring about important changes
in Wisconsin civil procedure in many respects, a comprehensive analysis of them is beyond the scope of this article. Since
the new rules of civil procedure have an effective date of January 1, 1976, none of the cases decided during the August, 1974
Term dealt directly with the application or interpretation of
the new rules. Thus, certain of the cases decided at this term
will have little or no applicability to actions commenced after
the end of 1975. Other decisions, however, will be fully applicable after the new rules of civil procedure take effect. So that
this article may be of more than academic interest, appropriate
references to and discussion of the new rules of civil procedure
will be made in the following analyses.
I. JURISDICTION
2
The decision in General Homes, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co. will
apply to actions commenced prior to the beginning of 1976, but
its authority thereafter is uncertain. In General Homes, the
plaintiff suffered a fire loss on December 30, 1971, and mailed
its summons and complaint to the Milwaukee County Sheriff's
Department for service sometime before December 30, 1972.
The summons and complaint were received by the Department
on January 3, 1973, and were served personally upon the defendant insurer on January 5th. The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that action had not been commenced
within one year from discovery of the loss as required by the
fire insurance contract. Appeal was taken from the trial court's
order denying summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the trial court,
1. 67 Wis. 2d 585 (1975).
2. 67 Wis. 2d 97, 226 N.W.2d 394 (1975).
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holding that the plaintiff had effectively commenced action
prior to the contractual deadline by mailing the summons and
complaint to the sheriff. Wisconsin Statutes sections 893.40
and 269.34(4) were construed in conjunction with one another
by the court in reaching its conclusion. Section 893.40 deems
an attempt to commence an action by delivery of the summons
to the sheriff, with the intent that it actually be served, equivalent to commencement. Under the facts present in the case at
bar, the summons was mailed prior to the expiration of the
time limit, but was not received by the sheriff until after the
deadline had passed. Interpretation of the term "delivery" was
thus crucial. The court stated that delivery was not defined in
the statute, but that section 269.34(4), which regulates service
of papers, provides that "service by mail is complete upon
mailing." It was recognized that delivery to the sheriff was not
actual service of a paper in a lawsuit, and that section 269.34(4)
technically might not apply, but the court determined that the
legislative policy judgment concerning the certainty of reception following mailing rendered the section applicable. The
opinion noted that the sheriff's address was readily ascertainable and that an appropriately addressed letter was certain to
reach that destination. With delivery by mail virtually assured,
the court indicated that personal delivery of process to the
sheriff was unnecessary and that utilization of a "mailbox rule"
in this instance was proper.
Adoption of the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, has resulted in repeal of section 893.40 and 269.34(4),
and has created an altered method for commencement of actions. Section 801.02(1) of the rules states:
A civil action in which a personal judgment is sought, other
than certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition, is
commenced as to any defendant when a summons and complaint naming him as defendant are filed with the court,
provided service of an authenticated copy of the summons
and of the complaint is made upon him under this chapter
within 60 days.
Procedure for commencement of an action under the new
Wisconsin rules is thus made more similar to that under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 An action is begun not when
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3, 4. See also Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of
Civil Procedure: Chapters 801-803, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5 (1976).
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the defendant is served, but when the original summons and
complaint are filed with the court.
Therefore, it appears that actions may effectively have been
commenced through December 31, 1975, by mere mailing of
process to the sheriff "or other proper officer of the county,"'
so that he could serve the defendant.
What action on and after January 1, 1976, will be effective
to commence a lawsuit in Wisconsin courts is, however, not
entirely certain. While both the Wisconsin and federal rules
deem an action commenced upon filing with the court, federal
court cases have generally held that process need not actually
be received in hand by the clerk of the court and be marked
"filed" in order to commence an action.5 Process is considered
to be filed when merely placed in the clerk's possession.6 Thus,
suit has been held to be commenced at the time process was
delivered to the clerk's officer, 7 at the time process mailed to
the clerk was deposited in his post office box,8 or even commenced at the time mailed process would have been delivered in
course of post?
Though the filing requirement has at times been strictly
construed,10 most federal courts seem to have taken a liberal
and relatively nontechnical approach to the requirement. Nevertheless, timely delivery has still been required in most cases,
and it appears that no federal court has gone so far as to say
that commencement of an action is effective upon mailing.
Resort has not been made to Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which states that service of subsequent pleadings and papers by mail is complete upon mailing.
Despite repeal of the statutes upon which the General
Homes decision was based, an altered method of commencement under the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure and an
apparent federal court insistence under similar procedural
rules that the complaint be timely placed in the clerk's posses4. Wis.

STAT.

§ 893.40 (1973).

5. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL [hereinafter
cited as WRIC.HT & MILLER], §§ 1052, 1153 (1970); Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
265 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 396 (1960).
6. Id.
7. Freeman v. Andrea, 282 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
8. Johansen v. Towson, 177 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
9. Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 200 F. Supp. 234 (D. N.J. 1961); Johnson
v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 181 F. Supp. 431 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
10. Casalduc v. Diaz, 117 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 639 (1941).
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sion, there seems to be no compelling reason why a "mailbox
rule" similar to that of General Homes should not be applicable under the new Wisconsin rules.
Section 801.14(2) deems service of both pleadings and papers by mail to be complete upon mailing, and while it might
not technically apply to filing of pleadings and process, the
policy judgment concerning certainty of reception after mailing, noted in General Homes should still be applicable. A letter
addressed to the clerk of a court should be as certain to reach
its destination as a letter addressed to the process division of a
sheriff's department.
While it would be unseemly for the Wisconsin court to
adopt a liberal commencement of action rule a few months
prior to the effective date of the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil
Procedure and to adopt a strict interpretation of the rules'
filing requirement thereafter, the cautious practitioner should
ensure actual delivery of the summons and complaint to the
clerk before a limitations deadline in order to avoid a jurisdictional challenge.
II.

PARTIES

Several significant decisions which related, broadly speaking, to the question of proper parties, were announced during
the 1974 Term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the recent
case of Schlosser v. Allis Chalmers Corp.," the court held that
compliance with-the general joinder statutes was not a prerequisite to the maintenance of a class action. The court also held
in Schlosser and in Mussallem v. Diners' Club, Inc.,' 2 that a
class action involving claims for separate damage recoveries
3
was not improper under the Wisconsin class action statute.'
In the first of the above cases, two plaintiffs, both retired
employees of the defendant's corporate legal department,
brought a class action to recover damages for the alleged failure
of the defendant to maintain group life insurance coverage as
promised. The action was brought on behalf of "all other retired non-union salaried employees of defendant who were retired as of February 1, 1973," a class of about 5,000 persons.
The complaint alleged that the corporation had, pursuant to its
11. 65 Wis. 2d 153, 222 N.W.2d 156 (1974).
12. 69 Wis. 2d 437, 230 N.W.2d 717 (1975).
13. Wis.

STAT.

§ 260.12 (1973).
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longstanding employee life insurance program, agreed to provide each member of the class with group life insurance at its
sole cost and at specified minimum levels. The plaintiffs further asserted that the details of the insurance program had
been communicated to the class members from time to time,
that the members relied on defendant's promises in accepting
and continuing employment and that the defendant unilaterally reduced minimum insurance coverage levels in 1973.
The defendant contended that the class members and their
causes of action had to be joinable under sections 263.04 or
260.10 before a class action could be maintained under section
260.12. The defendant demurred, asserting that there were
5,000 separate and distinct causes of action, and thus no "subject of the action" in which all the members of the class had
an interest pursuant to section 260.10. Similarly, it was
claimed that the 5,000 separate causes of action did not affect
all of the parties to the action as required by section 263.04.
The court agreed with the defendant that the facts presented in the case did not fall within the requirements of sections 260.10 or 263.04, but rejected the argument that a class
action could not for that reason be maintained. It was concluded that although sections 263.04, 260.10, 260.11 and 260.12
all pertained to joinder of parties and causes of action, the
specific statute governing class actions, section 260.12, was
controlling, rather than the other more general joinder statutes.
In interpreting the class action provisions of section 260.12, the
Wisconsin court disapproved earlier cases which restrictively
required that class members be necessary parties subject to
compulsory joinder before a class action could be instituted.'4
The restrictive interpretation given class action provisions by
a number of courts was motivated by concern about the res
judicata effect and the broader constitutional question of due
process.' 5 In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble6 and
Hansberryv. Lee, 17 however, the United States Supreme Court
put those questions to rest. The latter case stated that class
14. Carstens v. Fond du Lac, 137 Wis. 465, 119 N.W. 117 (1909); Foster v. Rowe,
132 Wis. 268, 111 N.W. 688 (1907); Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light
Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851 (1900); Gilkey v. Merrill, 67 Wis. 459, 30 N.W. 733
(1886); Barnes v. Beloit, 19 Wis. 104 (1865); Newcomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 594 (1864).
15. 7 WRiGHT & MILLER, § 1751.
16. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
17. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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parties need not be necessary parties or have joint interests in
order to be bound by the judgment; it is sufficient that "they
are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present." 8
Continuing the permissive attitude toward class actions
expressed in most prior Wisconsin decisions, the Schlosser
court reiterated the criteria for a class action:
(1) The named parties "must have a right or interest in common with the persons represented;" (2) the named parties
"must fairly represent the interest or right involved so that
the issue may be fairly and honestly tried;" and (3) it must
be "impracticable to bring all interested persons before the
court." 9
Pointing to the size of the class and the zealous litigation by
the attorney plaintiffs, the court summarily disposed of criteria
(2) and (3) above. The court then described the community of
interest criterion as follows:
[T]he court must determine whether the advantages of disposing of the entire controversy in one proceeding are outweighed by the difficulties of combining divergent issues and
persons. It is a question of the balance of convenience
whether the court will settle all the issues in one suit; or will
settle only the common question in one suit and then allow
the independent questions to proceed in separate equity
suits; or not settle the controversy at all in a single suit."
The court approved the flexible "balancing" test as stated by
Chafee and applied it to the facts of the Schlosser case. While
the defendant argued that different promises were made to
each of the 5,000 class members and that different amounts of
insurance were in force, the court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that the same insurance program was promised to each
class member and that the allegation was to be regarded as true
for the purposes of demurrer. Further, the defendant changed
the program at the same time and in the same respect to each
member. The common question which the court found related
to the nature of the group life insurance program, the matter
of the defendant's unilateral change in the program and the
18. Id. at 43.
19. 65 Wis. 2d at 169, 222 N.W.2d at 164-65.
20. Id. at 172, 222 N.W.2d at 166, quoting Z.
193 (1950).

CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY
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appropriate formula to be used to measure the class members'
damages. On the other hand, the most significant question not
common to the class was apparently the determination of each
individual's amount of damages. The court indicated that individual damage amounts could be established separately after
the common issues were tried. Thus, it seems that the second
of Chafee's suggested alternatives was endorsed for the case at
bar.
The same balancing test seems to have been implicitly applied in the subsequent case of Mussallem V. Diners' Club,
Inc.2" Although the Mussallem case dealt primarily with the
questions of whether a class action for the recovery of usurious
interest was precluded by public policy or by statute, the court
there considered the appropriateness of a class action based on
numerous individual transactions. The court concluded that
the Schlosser test had been met in that case, where, although
different transactions and interest rates were involved, the 500
class members were all participants in the defendant's same
revolving charge account plan.
A further element of the class action balancing test must
also be considered. In the closing paragraphs of the Schlosser
decision, the court quoted with approval a California case"
which stated:
It is more likely that, absent a class suit, defendant will retain the benefits from its alleged wrongs. A procedure that
would permit the allegedly injured parties to recover. . . is
to be preferred over the foregoing alternatives.?1
Express recognition is thus given arguably to the equities of the
case, and certainly to the practical effect which the barring of
a class action would have on the plaintiffs' ability to recover.
Although the Schlosser and Mussallem decisions are in substantial compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
the Wisconsin court's criteria are not as extensive as those
denominated in the federal rule. Since its adoption, rule 23 has
been embroiled in controversy that has not abated with its 1966
amendment. In Schlosser, the court said of the Wisconsin class
action statute:
21. 69 Wis. 2d 437, 230 N.W.2d 717 (1975).
22. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
23. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738, quoted at 65 Wis. 2d at 179,
222 N.W.2d at 169.
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Sec. 260.12, Stats., has been described as "one of the
worst" provisions in the Field Code, and has intentionally
been left in vague language unamended. As an 1878 Revisor's
note comments:
" . . .This section is not a very exact definition of the
proceeding intended; but as the difficulty lies in the nature
of the subject, it has seemed best to attempt no amendment,
but to leave the requirements to be worked out by the courts
as cases arise.
See Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 663 (footnote
2
omitted)."
Perhaps the controversy over rule 23 and the "difficulty with
the subject matter" explains why no attempt was made to
amend the class action provision of section 260.12 as appears
in section 803.08 of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure. In
any event, the decision in Schlosser is in conformity with section 803.03(5), which expressly excepts class actions from the
general party joinder provisions of section 803.03.
Determination of whether a party is "necessary" or "indispensable" has historically been a complex and controversial
problem. Under the conventional approach, courts and commentators have drawn distinctions between those parties who
were to be deemed "necessary," and those who were to be held
"indispensable." In the former class were those who generally
ought to be included in the action unless there existed an
excuse for their nonjoinder. In the latter class were those persons who had to be joined before an action could properly go
forward. Following the landmark case of Shields v. Barrow,26
the distinction often turned on whether or not the interests of
the parties were "severable." In the search for more certain
rules, many decisions placed emphasis on determination of the
nature of the interest or obligation involved, that is, whether
the interest was "joint" or "severable," rather than on a determination of whether in equity and good conscience the action
ought to go forward without the missing party. 7 To make
"pragmatic considerations and equity-and-good-conscience"
determinative of who must be joined, however, rule 19 of the
24. 65 Wis. 2d at 168, 169, 222 N.W.2d at 164, citing Notes to Revision, ch. 118, §
2604, p. 185 (1878).

25. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE [hereinafter cited as
(1965).
26. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
27. See JAMES § 9.21.

JAMES],

§ 9.14, et seq.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1966.8
In the recent case of Kochel v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,29 the Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished a
previous case" which had predicated findings of indispensability upon the theory that the parties held "joint interests,"
and reaffirmed the holding of E. L. Husting v. Coca-Cola Co.,31
that indispensability is dependent upon feasibility of joinder.
A technical analysis of the property interest involved was, however, an important element in the Kochel decision.
Jerry Kochel, father of five adult children, was killed in an
automobile accident. Subsequently, Kochel's two sons commenced a wrongful death action, but his three daughters,
children of a previous marriage, were not joined as plaintiffs.
The defendants interposed a plea in abatement and obtained
summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the ground of failure to join indispensable parties.
The plaintiffs made a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment and submitted affidavits from two of the sisters stating that they were residents of other states, that they had not
been in the state of Wisconsin since their father's death, and
that they renounced any interest in the plaintiffs' action.
Plaintiffs' attorney submitted a third affidavit which stated
that the remaining sister had been living abroad, her exact
whereabouts unknown. Relying primarily upon Truesdill v.
Roach,32 the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
In Truesdill, a case involving a similar factual situation, the
Wisconsin court held that all of the persons authorized by section 895.04 to bring a wrongful death action were united in
interest and thus indispensable parties within the meaning of
section 260.12. The court there said:
We hold a cause of action for wrongful death is a single cause
of action with ownership thereof vested in "the person to
whom the amount recovered belongs" as designated in sec.
331.04(2).33

WRIGHT & MILLER § 1608.
66 Wis. 2d 405, 225 N.W.2d 604 (1975).
Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 492, 105 N.W.2d 871 (1960).
194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927).
11 Wis. 2d 492, 105 N.W.2d 871 (1960).
Id. at 497, 105 N.W.2d at 874.

28. 7
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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The court stated in addition that "commencement of an action
for wrongful death by a person to whom only part of the recovery belongs" 34 was impermissible. Thus it is apparent that the
Truesdill holding was grounded upon the traditional determination of "jointness" or "severability" of the interests of the
plaintiffs. However, the Truesdill decision contained the following language:
In the instant case no trial on the merits has been had and
no reason given in the brief or pointed out why the plaintiff
and the mother of the deceased child cannot start the action
over or how they would be prejudiced thereby."
Relying upon that qualification, the Kochel court seized the
opportunity to condition mandatory joinder upon feasibility. It
was held that the trial court erred in failing to consider the
questions of jurisdiction over the absent parties, renunciation
of interest, or running of the statute of limitations as to their
possible claims. By requiring the trial court to examine pragmatic considerations, the court moved in the direction of the
provisions of new section 803.03 which, except for subsection
(2), is borrowed from rule 19 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
That inability to secure jurisdiction over a party might obviate that party's indispensability was established in the landmark case of E.L. Husting v. Coca-Cola Co.36 In the Husting
case, the plaintiff brought action against the Western CocaCola Bottling Company for breach of contract and against local
Wisconsin firms for aiding Western to breach the contract. The
plaintiff also sought to restrain the local defendants from performing their contracts with Western. The trial court found
Western's interests such as to render it indispensable, notwithstanding plaintiff's inability to serve Western with process
under existing statutes. The supreme court reversed, holding
that the necessary joinder statutes should not be construed to
require the impossible.
The Kochel court reiterated the holding in Husting and
considered the jurisdictional questions raised by the affidavits
relating to the three absent sisters. Since the affidavits had not
been controverted by the defendants, the court held them con34. Id. af 498, 105 N.W.2d at 874.
35. Id. at 499, 105 N.W.2d at 875.
36. 194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927).
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clusive. The absentees were thus found, because of their residence outside of Wisconsin and their lack of minimal contacts
with' the state, to be beyond the personal jurisdiction of the
court. Since jurisdiction could not be asserted over the absent
sisters, the court held, the plaintiffs' action was not defeated.
The finding that the absentees were not indispensable also
rested on other grounds. The court found, as well, that the
statute of limitations barred the sisters from commencing an
independent wrongful death action in the future. In resolving
this issue, the court relied upon the recent case of Heifetz v.
Johnson,3 7 which held that when an otherwise indispensable

party's ability to commence an independent action on the same
matter was terminated by the statute of limitations, "indispensable" status also ceased. This was so, the court recognized,
because:
[Tihe purpose of the mandatory joinder statutes is to protect the defendant against a multiplicity of suits and ...

the

purpose is served when by operation of the statute of limitations the [absentee] is barred forever from any claim against
the defendant. 8
The court found in Kochet that the plaintiffs had timely
brought suit and that the statute of limitations had been tolled
as to their "part" of the action. The statute had continued to
run as to the sisters' portion, however, and was found to have
barred their potential future claims. Thus the sisters were no
longer indispensable parties.
While the Kochel decision rested partially upon the above
pragmatic considerations, the nature of the property interest
was of considerable importance. As stated previously, in
Truesdill v. Roach,39 the court stated that persons authorized
to bring a wrongful death action are united in interest. Furthermore, in Heifetz v. Johnson," it was said that certain parties
are excluded from the equitable principle that the running of
the statute of limitations terminates indispensability status.
Joint owners, such as joint payees on a note, are said to be
required to jointly bring an action because they are entitled to
one undivided recovery. The Kochel court cited Truesdill v.
Roach, however, in support of the proposition that a wrongful
37.
38.
39.
40.

61 Wis. 2d
Id. at 123,
11 Wis. 2d
61 Wis. 2d

111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
211 N.W.2d at 840-41.
492, 105 N.W.2d 871 (1960).
111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
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death claimant is only entitled to recover the amount of his
own individual loss. Claimants under the wrongful death statute then, although united in interest, are not tantamount to
joint owners, and their "indispensable" status may be overcome by operation of the statute of limitations.
Thus the "verbal anomaly [of] an indispensable person
who turns out to be dispensable after all," 4 ' and a reliance upon
conceptual, property-based classifications of interests, continue under the former mandatory joinder statute. Section
803.03 of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, which
replaced the former statute, expressly conditions joinder on
feasibility and holds paramount a balancing test involving
pragmatic and equitable analysis. Subsection (2) of the statute
also requires that all persons who at the commencement of the
action have claims based upon subrogation, derivation or assignment be joined with the party asserting a claim for affirmative relief. The Judicial Council Committee's Note states that
the intention of subsection (2) is to require that "all 'parts' of
a single cause of action . . . be brought before the court in one
action." Thus it appears that under the new Wisconsin Rules
of Civil Procedure there is to be but one commencement as to
all of the claim's constituent parts, and that the rules deem
holders of all of the "parts" to be necessary parties.
If such necessary parties cannot be joined, the court is to
conduct an analysis under the standards of subsection
803.03(3) to determine if, in equity and good conscience, the
action should go forward. That analysis should not be confined
to or focused upon a technical consideration of the nature of the
interest involved. While the type of interest will affect pragmatic questions of the adequacy of relief and possible prejudice
to present and absent parties, analysis is not to cease there.
The court must also consider the seriousness and immediacy
of collateral consequences or of the threat of fresh action by the
absentee. In addition, the court must take into account the
effect of dismissal upon the plaintiff, the possibility of shaping
relief to avoid prejudice or inequity, and other practical matters. Only if the court determines that the action ought not go
forward will the missing party be denominated "indispensable."
41. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 117, n.

12 (1968).
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One other recent case relating to the issue of proper parties
42
also bears mention. The defendants in Kujus v. Schmidman,
a group of liquor retailers, demurred to the complaint in an
action brought by fellow Milwaukee County retailers to enjoin
alleged violations of fair trade contracts. It was argued by the
defendants that only producers or vendors had standing to seek
an injunction for violation of the Wisconsin Fair Trade Act.43
Both the trial and the appellate courts found, however, that the
plaintiffs were bound by the resale price restrictions of the fair
trade agreements, and that they were affected and allegedly
damaged by the defendants' actions. Therefore it was held,
upon New York case law authority" and a plain reading of the
statute, that the plaintiff retailers fell within the class of "any
person damaged thereby" and were authorized to bring the
action.
The defendants attempted to rely on Old DearbornDistributing Co. v. Seagram Distiller Corp.," the leading Supreme
Court decision which established the constitutional validity of
state fair trade laws. The Court there stated that the primary
aim of the fair trade acts was to protect the goodwill value of
the producer's product. On the issue of standing to bring suit,
however, courts have generally concluded that a retailer may
bring action against other retail sellers." Although fair trade
laws have been enacted by forty-six of the states, their constitutional validity, social desirability and economic effectiveness
have long been questioned.4 7 Fair trade acts in a majority of the
states have succumbed to court decisions or legislative repeal.4"
The Kujus case might be viewed as an opportunity offered
the Wisconsin court to curtail the effectiveness of the state's
42. 66 Wis. 2d 544, 225 N.W.2d 484 (1975).
43. Wis. STAT. § 133.25 (1973).
44. Whelan Drug Co. v. Doz, Inc., 16 Misc. 2d 639, 183 N.Y. Supp. 2d 255 (1958);
Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros., 253 App. Div. 188, 1 N.Y. Supp.
2d 802 (1938).
45. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
46. See Auto Rental Co. v. Lee, 35 Hawaii 77 (1939); Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n.
v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756 (1940); Cooley v. White Cross
Health & Beauty Aids Discount Centers, Inc., 229 Md. 343, 183 A.2d 381 (1962);
Schenley Prods. Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 100, 199 A. 402 (1938);
Whelan Drug Co. v. Doz, Inc., 16 Misc. 2d 639, 183 N.Y. Supp. 2d 255 (1958); Port
Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros., 253 App. Div. 188, 1 N.Y. Supp. 2d
802 (1938).
47. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 6017, 6021 (1975).
48. Id. at 6041.
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fair trade statute by restricting the class of persons who may
seek to enjoin its violation. The court said, however:
It is not for courts to determine the wisdom of this type of
legislation. It is enough to conclude that the legislature...
gave standing to these plaintiffs to bring this type of action. 9
III.

PLEADINGS

The sufficiency of the pleader's statement of facts in a complaint was the subject of the controversy in National Foundation of Health, Welfare & Pension Funds, Inc. v. Brookfield.'"
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in that case that where
a party sought tax-exempt status, it was required to plead facts
which brought it not only within the language of the exemption
statute, but also within restrictive court interpretations of that
statute.
The plaintiff, a non-profit, non-stock corporation, owned
certain real and personal property in the City of Brookfield. A
dispute arose between the plaintiff and the city over the exempt status of a portion of the property, and taxes were paid
"under protest" in 1973. After a claim for a refund was filed
and denied, litigation was commenced to recover taxes paid
and to have the property in question declared tax-exempt
under section 70.11(4). That section provides:
70.11 Property exempted from taxation. The property
described in this section is exempted from general property
taxes:
(4). .. Property owned and used exclusively by. . .educational. . . associations. . . but not exceeding 10 acres of
land necessary for location and convenience of buildings
while such property is not used for profit.
The plaintiffs complaint alleged that its property was taxexempt "pursuant to section 70.11, Wis. Stats., as property
owned and used exclusively by an educational association."
The city's demurrer to the complaint was overruled by the trial
court.
On appeal, the defendant argued that an allegation that the
property was owned and used exclusively by an educational
association was not tantamount to an allegation that the
49. 66 Wis. 2d at 549, 225 N.W.2d at 487.
50. 65 Wis. 2d 263, 222 N.W.2d 608 (1974).
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property was used exclusively for educational purposes. Since
neither the activities of the association nor the uses to which
its property was put had been set out in the complaint, the
statement of facts was claimed to be fatally defective. The
plaintiff countered by urging the familiar proposition that complaints are to be liberally construed on demurrer and by asserting that the missing elements could be supplied by reasonable
inference. The court agreed with the defendant and held that
the demurrer should have been sustained.
The court's decision in National Foundation may be seen
as embodying two related concepts. First, a "special case" was
presented wherein the plaintiff sought to have its property declared exempt from general taxes. The supreme court has repeatedly construed the statute by which the plaintiff claimed
exemption' to require the party seeking exemption to bring
himself within the statute."2 Furthermore, the court has said
that the exemption statutes are to be strictly construed, and
the taxpayer must bring himself within the exact terms of the
statute.-3 Taxation is to be the rule, exemption the exception."
Second, the additional pleading requirement may be predicated upon the vagueness of the statute. It has been held that
where a statute is "so indefinite, obscure and uncertain that it
fails to define what acts are within its terms,"5 5 the complaint
grounded on the statute must allege facts beyond the statutory
language in order to establish the cause of action. Since the
51. Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1973).
52. Engineer & Scientists v. Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572 (1968);
In re Thomas' Estate, 1 Wis. 2d 402, 84 N.W.2d 68 (1957); Men's Halls Stores v. Dane
County, 269 Wis. 84, 69 N.W.2d 213 (1955); Bowman Dairy Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm., 240 Wis. 1, 1 N.W.2d 224 (1942).
53. State v. Madison, 55 Wis. 2d 427, 198 N.W.2d 615 (1972); Bethel Convalescent
Home, Inc. v. Richfield, 15 Wis. 2d 1, 111 N.W.2d 913 (1962); State ex rel. Dane
County Title Co. v. Board of Review, 2 Wis. 2d 51, 85 N.W.2d 864 (1957); Madison
Aerie No. 623 v. Madison, 275 Wis. 472, 82 N.W.2d 207 (1957); Albion v. Trask, 256
Wis. 485, 41 N.W.2d 627 (1950); Comet Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Taxation, 243 Wis.
117, 9 N.W.2d 620 (1943).
54. State v. Madison, 55 Wis. 2d 427, 198 N.W.2d 615 (1972); Alonzo Cudworth
Post No. 23 v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 2d 1, 165 N.W.2d 397 (1969); Engineers & Scientists
v. Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572 (1968); In re Thomas' Estate, 1 Wis.
2d 402, "84N.W.2d 68 (1957); Evangelical Luth. Church v. Shawano County, 256 Wis.
2d 196, 40 N.W.2d 590 (1950); Legion Clubhouse v. Madison, 248 Wis. 380, 21 N.W.2d
668 (1946).

55. 2
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Zillmann, 121 Wis. 472, 98 N.W. 543 (1904).

312 (1954), citing State v.
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court found it necessary in an earlier case" to construe the
exemption statute in question as applicable only to educational
associations devoted to "traditional" education activities, the
restrictive construction in NationalFoundationmay have been
an appropriate means of obviating vagueness in pleadings.
The additional pleading requirement of the National
Foundation case should be short-lived, however. Section
802.02(1) of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure borrows
from Federal Rule 8(a) its general rule that a pleading contain:
a short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the
transaction, occurrence or event out of which the claim arises
and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Judicial Council Committee's Note avows that the federal
pleading philosophy is adopted. For some time after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts
struggled with the parameters of the phrases "short and plain
statement of the claim" and "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 57 Particularly troublesome was the belief that
the latter phrase in effect required a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Endorsement of that belief
brought about a return to code pleading." Similarly, some federal courts sought to engraft upon the rule a more extensive
pleading requirement for special cases, civil antitrust actions
in particular. 9 Both interpretations are now generally rejected," and in actions seeking a tax refund, a claim stating a
demand for a refund, without more, is sufficient in the federal
courts.6 ' It would appear that under the notice pleading philosophy of the federal courts, the comparable Wisconsin Rules of
Civil Procedure need not require an allegation that the restrictive construction of the tax exemption statute had been met by
the plaintiff.
In the recent case of Becker v. Becker,12 the Wisconsin court
56. Engineers & Scientists v. Milwaukee, 38
57. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 1216, 1217.

Wis. 2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572 (1968).

58. Id. at § 1220.
59. Id. at § 1228.
60. Id. at § 1221.
61. Wolinski v. Hoffman, 119 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. N.Y. 1954); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Pa. 1951); National Title & Mortgage Co.
v. Duffy, 42 F. Supp. 844 (D. N.J. 1941), rev'd on othergrounds, 132 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1942).
62. 66 Wis. 2d 731, 225 N.W.2d 884 (1975).

1976]

TERM OF THE COURT

had occasion to consider whether equitable defenses were available against a plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit.3
Three brothers and their sister constituted the board of directors of a closely-held corporation. A stockholder's derivative
action was commenced by one of the directors to recover allegedly excessive compensation paid two of the other directors.
The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had himself voted for and received
payment under the contracts which provided the allegedly excessive compensation, and that he had waited five years before
commencing the action. Thus it was contended that the defenses of equitable estoppel, unclean hands and laches were
established as a matter of law.
The motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial
court on the ground that equitable defenses are not available
against a plaintiff who has brought suit in a representative
capacity. The denial of summary judgment was affirmed, but
on different grounds. The supreme court found there remained
substantial unresolved questions of fact, and for that reason
summary judgment was unavailable. However, the court held
in a brief opinion that a stockholder's derivative suit is an
equitable action and that equitable defenses are available
therein, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff brought
action in a representative capacity.
Thus an equitable defense, based upon the improper conduct of the plaintiff, is effective to bar a plaintiff shareholder
from bringing a derivative suit. The holding is consistent with
federal cases interpreting rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."4 The action is abated and the particular plaintiff
is precluded from establishing the action. Another shareholder
who is not similarly disqualified, however, may bring the action. "
IV.

DIscOvERY

Two cases decided during the 1974 Term of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court significantly affected the protection afforded to
attorneys' work product. In Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry
Co.,6 the supreme court held defendant's attorney to have
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Wis. Stat. § 180.405 (1973).
See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, § 1834.
Id.
65 Wis. 2d 468, 222 N.W.2d 920 (1974).
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waived protection of certain information through his course of
conduct before trial. The attorney was required to furnish all
other counsel in the case with a written report of the testing
results and examination of an expert retained by the defendant.
The Blakely case was a products liability action which
stemmed from the failure of certain yoke-bar castings manufactured by the defendant Waukesha Foundry Co. and incorporated into the plaintiffs' quick-cooking devices. After the lawsuit was commenced, Waukesha Foundry's attorney wrote to
the plaintiffs' lawyer, informing him that inspection of the
yoke-bars in the plaintiffs' possession was important to the
defendant's case, and requested that the yoke-bars be temporarily turned over to the defendant for expert examination. It
appeared from the record of pretrial conferences and motion
hearings in the case that the plaintiff agreed to furnish the
yoke-bars for examination and that the plaintiffs and the defendant agreed to exchange expert reports when inspection and
testing by each side were completed.
After the yoke-bars were returned to the plaintiffs, a time
for hearing was set by the trial court in the event that the
experts' reports were not exchanged. As the deadline for the
exchange of reports approached, the defendant's attorney notified counsel and the court by letter that the expert who had
performed testing for the defendant had been retained by defense counsel on a personal consulting basis only, and that he
did not intend to call the expert as a witness at trial. Therefore,
Waukesha Foundry's attorney claimed that the results of the
expert's examination were lawyer's work product under State
ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court,67 and would not be available to
opposing counsel.
The plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court to order
the defendant foundry to turn over its expert's report. The
defendant's attorney thereafter filed an affidavit stating that
the expert had never submitted a formal, specific, written report to the defendant, and that defense counsel had only had
oral discussions with the expert.
At the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court
judge indicated that he was clearly of the opinion that there
had been a stipulation between the parties to exchange expert
67. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
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reports. He also left no doubt that he was surprised and somewhat chagrined by defense counsel's use of legal procedures to
obtain vital evidence for examination and his subsequent failure to exchange reports. Defendant's attorney was ordered to
furnish a written report of the expert's examination and to
make the expert available for adverse examination.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the defendant's
lawyer had waived the work product privilege which otherwise
would certainly have attached to the communications between
the attorney and his nonforensic expert.68 The waiver was effective despite the lack of "a firm agreement that such exchange
would be made under any and all conditions"69 and extended
to all communications on the subject of test results and examination, written and oral, 7° between the expert and the defendant or the defense attorney's law office. The supreme court
therefore ordered the defendant's lawyer to produce all pertinent written communication from the expert and to furnish the
other attorneys in the case with written summaries of all relevant oral communications and of all pertinent notes made by
the lawyer and kept in his files. The portion of the trial court
order which required the defendant's attorney to make the expert available for adverse examination by other counsel was,
however, disapproved and reversed. The court stated that the
waiver extended only to communications between the attorney
and the expert and that no compelling need was demonstrated
for such adverse examinations.
Although a reading of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure might indicate the contrary, the holding of the Blakely
case ought to have continued vitality after the new rules take
effect. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts
who are not expected to be called as witnesses at trial is strictly
limited by section 804.01(2)(d)(2) to "exceptional circumstances under which it is impossible for the party seeking discovery
to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
68. Id. at 589-92, 150 N.W.2d at 404-05.
69. 65 Wis. 2d at 478, 222 N.W.2d at 925.
70. Defendant's attorney admitted on oral argument that he had received written
communication from the expert regarding the results of the examination and admitted
further that existence of such communication had not been revealed to the trial court.
The supreme court demonstrated considerable concern with this matter, since the
attorney had filed an affidavit with the trial court which stated that no detailed written
report had been received by him. 65 Wis. 2d at 476, 477, 222 N.W.2d at 924.
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means." No such showing of exceptional circumstances was
made or required in the Blakely case. Instead, the trial and
appellate courts held that the defendant had waived immunity
by stipulation and that the plaintiff was entitled to discover
the facts and opinions communicated by the expert to the defendant and its attorneys, irrespective of special need.
Stipulations regarding methods of discovery other than
those provided by chapter 804 are, however, expressly permitted by section 804.04, which was modeled after the 1970
amendment to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
While section 804.04 requires written stipulations, a review of
Wisconsin case law suggests that the requirement of a writing
may not be strictly adhered to in situations such as that presented in Blakely.
A line of Wisconsin cases has held that oral stipulations
entered into in open court are binding on the parties, notwithstanding the lack of a written agreement." Two other Wisconsin cases, State v. Eschweiler7 2 and Burnham v. Smith," hold
that where injustice will be avoided, an oral stipulation will be
given effect, even if the rules require a writing. A quotation
from the latter case is instructive:
[A]lthough the rule requires stipulations to be in writing, in
order to be binding, yet it was not designed to allow a party
who had entered into a verbal stipulation, upon which his
adversary had relied and acted, to obtain an unjust advantage, and destroy the other's rights by disregarding it himself.74
A distinction has also been recognized between stipulations
regarding "merely procedural matters" and those which are
intended to affect substantive rights and obligations. Procedural stipulations have been viewed as requiring less formality
than those substantive stipulations which have all the essential
characteristics of contracts and ought to be in writing to minimize the potential for future disputes over important matters.7 5
71. Wyandotte Chem. Corp. v. Royal Elec. Mfg. Co., 66 Wis. 2d 577, 225 N.W.2d
648 (1975); Markham v. Markham, 65 Wis. 2d 735, 223 N.W.2d 616 (1974); Schmidt
v. Schmidt, 40 Wis. 2d 649, 162 N.W.2d 618 (1968); Baker Land & Title Co. v. Bayfield
County Land Co., 166 Wis. 601, 166 N.W. 314 (1918).
72. 158 Wis. 25, 147 N.W. 1008 (1914).
73. 11 Wis. 269 (1860).
74. Id. at 270.
75. Paine v. Chicago & N.W.Ry., 217 Wis. 601, 258 N.W.846 (1935).
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The better practice clearly calls for reduction of procedural
stipulations to writing in order to avoid controversy and to
increase the likelihood of enforcement. Where, however, injustice would otherwise result to a party who had acted in good
faith, the court may enforce an informal oral agreement, even
where important procedural rights will be forfeited thereby.
7
In State ex rel. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court,
the Wisconsin court extended discovery immunity to the
names and reports of nonforensic experts consulted by insurance company claims personnel in the evaluation of cases or in
preparation for litigation. The plaintiff insurance company
paid a claim on a policy of fire insurance, became subrogated
to the rights of its insured, and commenced a products liability
action against the General Electric Company. Defense counsel
deposed the plaintiff's local claims manager pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum and sought the names and reports of experts retained by the plaintiff who had examined the electrical
applicance which was the subject of the lawsuit. On the advice
of counsel, the deponent declined to provide the requested information, and the questions were certified to the circuit court.
The court ordered the questions to be answered, and the plaintiff petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition.
The supreme court granted the writ after a consideration of
policy and of pertinent language in the leading case of State ex
rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court.7 7 In Dudek, the court had voiced
concern for protection of information acquired in anticipation
of litigation by persons other than lawyers, but the Shelby case
marked the first concrete application of the "work product"
immunity to nonlawyers.
The court pointed out that the mental impressions of a
lawyer were not in issue and could not constitute a ground for
the extension of the immunity to a claims manager. Dudek,
however, had indicated that the "mental processes of the attorney" rationale was not the sole basis for the lawyer's work
product rule in Wisconsin; discouragement of evasion, sharp
practices and indolence also underlay the rule. Thus, the court
felt it appropriate to encourage the use of nonlawyer investigators as an incentive to efficiency and diligence. Further, the
76. 67 Wis. 2d 469, 228 N.W.2d 161 (1975).
77. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
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work of claims personnel was recognized to be "particularly
quasi-legal" in nature because it involved research and investigation to prepare for, or determine the necessity of, litigation.
A footnote to the opinion stated: "The gist of our holding
is incorporated in the proposed Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, sec. 804.01(2)(c)1 and (d)2 . .."I'Those subsections
govern discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial, and discovery of facts
known or opinions held by experts not expected to be called as
witnesses, respectively. There is no doubt that under section
804.01(2)(d)2 reports of consulting, nonforensic experts retained by an insurance company claims manager would be
immunized from discovery absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. Some question has arisen as to whether the names
of nonforensic experts are similarly protected by rule
26(b)(4)(B), the portion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
corresponding to section 804.01(2)(d)2.11
The introductory language in section 804.01(2)(d) states
that discovery "may be obtained only as follows . . ." (emphasis added). Subsection 2 then states that facts known or
opinions held by specially retained nonforensic experts may be
discovered upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. While
both the federal and the Wisconsin rules are silent as to discovery of the names of retained experts, the Advisory Committee
Note to the 1970 amendment of Federal Rule 26 states: "As an
ancillary procedure, a party may on a proper showing require
the party to name experts retained or specially employed
. ... Thus it appears that the names of the consulting experts may be obtained, but the nature of the "ancillary procedure" and the "proper showing" are not clear.80
On the other hand, the federal and Wisconsin rules have no
provision for experts consulted informally in anticipation of
litigation but not retained or specially employed. In view of the
restrictive language of the discovery rules, it appears that the
names and reports of such experts are not subject to discov8
ery. '
".

'"

78. 67 Wis. 2d at 475, 228 N.W.2d at 164.
79. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, §§ 2029, 2032.
80. It has been speculated that the "procedure" would be a rule 33 interrogatory,
and that the party objecting to discovery might seek a protective order if he thought
the names were irrelevant, privileged or for some other reason not properly discoverable. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2032.
81. Id. at § 2033.
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Finally it should be noted, however, that an expert's information which is not "acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial" is not subject to immunity and is discoverable by means of the routine discovery procedures.82
V.

AFFIRMATIvE DEFENSES: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In Rosenthal v. Kurtz,"3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court engaged in a preliminary consideration of the constitutional validity of the statute of limitations" relating to property damage, personal injury or wrongful death caused by the defective
or unsafe condition of improvements to real property. While
constitutionality of section 893.155 was not an issue in the appeal of the Rosenthal case, and the court's decision there was
based upon a reading of the statute which avoided a constitutional confrontation,"5 the court nevertheless seriously questioned the validity of the statute. The opinion stated:
It would appear likely.

. .

that a constitutional challenge to

sec. 893.155, Stats., on any one of several grounds, including
improper classification, might have substantial arguable
merit. We believe we would be derelict in our duty to the
legislature if we did not point out the extremely shaky constitutional and statutorily anomalous underpinnings of the statute."
The court concluded its discussion of section 893.155 by suggesting that in the future a case might arise in which the
confrontation-avoiding technique used in Rosenthal would not
be applicable and that the constitutionality of that statute
would have to be faced head-on. Such a case was not long in
coming.
Some eleven months after the decision in Rosenthal was
announced, Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co.8' was
argued before the Wisconsin court. In December, 1968, an underground high-pressure water line on Square D's premises
ruptured, causing the innundation of plaintiffs' adjacent prop82. Id.
83. 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741, 216 N.W.2d 252 (1974).
84. Wis. STAT. § 893.155 (1973).
85. The court construed the statute to permit the bringing of an action against an
architect within 6 years from completion of construction, even though the architect's

services were provided before completion of the structure.
86. 62 Wis. 2d at 11, 213 N.W.2d at 746.
87. 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
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erty. It was alleged that defendant ITT Grinnell Corporation
negligently installed the water line as part of a fire protection
system sometime between 1945 and 1952. ITT Grinnell demurred to the complaint, relying on Wisconsin Statute section
893.155.
The trial court overruled the demurrer on the ground that
a question of fact was presented which could only be resolved
at trial. That question was whether the fire protection system
the defendant installed was an "improvement to real property"
within the meaning of the applicable statute of limitations.
On appellate review, the supreme court first found that the
fire protection system was an "improvement to property" as a
matter of law, and that the demurrer should have been sustained by the trial judge, absent a constitutional challenge or
legal defense. The court next determined that a process of interpretation, such as that used in Rosenthal v. Kurtz, could not
be utilized in the case at bar to avoid the constitutional question. Under no interpretation of the facts could the date of
injury be brought within six years of either the end of defendants' performance of services or the completion of the entire
construction. Construction was finished in 1952, but plaintiffs'
injury did not come about until 1968. Thus the six-year statute
of limitations barred action against those who designed,
planned or constructed the fire protection system in 1958, ten
years before the harm occurred.
Of the possible grounds for constitutional challenge,88 the
court's opinion in Kallas Millwork dealt with two: denial of
equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, and deprivation
of a remedy for a wrong recognized under state law in contravention of article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Violation of the Wisconsin Constitution was dealt with only
briefly and in an ambiguous manner. The second paragraph of
the opinion flatly stated that section 893.155 was unconstitutional under article I, section 9, because of its denial of a remedy for a recognized right. The penultimate paragraph of the
opinion equivocated. There the court stated only that it found
"arguable merit" in the argument based upon the Wisconsin
88. Other grounds might include: denial of due process of law, discrimination,
enactment of special and local legislation, and arbitrary and capricious legislative
action.
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Constitution and that section 893.155 "appear[ed]to abrogate
a remedy for a very real wrong"89 (emphasis added).
Much more thorough analysis and discussion were devoted
to the equal protection argument. The plaintiff argued that
special immunity was granted to certain members of a class,
that protection was withheld from other members of the same
class, and that there existed no rational or valid grounds for
distinguishing between those who were protected and those
who were not. Those persons who performed and furnished
"design, planning, supervision of construction or construction"
of improvements were afforded immunity by the statute but
other potential defendants were not. In particular, materialmen were ignored by the statute and owners and occupiers of
land were specifically excepted.
Defendant ITT Grinnell argued that a statute of limitations
as to any cause of action was a public policy question which
should be left to the legislature and that section 893.155 was
fair and reasonable in its provision of immunity. Reliance was
placed upon decisions of other jurisdictions which had validated similar legislation. In response to the equal protection
argument, the Arkansas Supreme Court responded that there
was a vital distinction between materialmen and owners on the
one hand and architects, designers and contractors on the
other.9" The New Jersey and Washington courts also reached
similar conclusions in recent cases.9' None of those decisions,
however, provided a convincing rationale for distinguishing
between the persons protected by the statute and those left
without protection. A fourth decision cited by ITT Grinnell,
Joseph v. Burns, 2 involved a dissimilar Oregon statute93 which
89. 66 Wis. 2d at 393, 225 N.W.2d at 460. A more complete exposition of the denial
of remedy argument might have been appropriate. The statute in question is unlike
the "typical" statute of limitations which bars claims after a specified time from the
accrual of the cause of action. Section 893.155 bases its computation of time upon
completion of services and construction, rather than upon the occurrence of an event
which gives rise to a claim. Although there are situations, amply illustrated in the
medical malpractice field, in which a statute of limitations may bar action before a
party realizes he has a cause of action, statutes such as § 873.155 may bar suit long
before the cause of action itself accrues.
90. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1096, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971).
91. Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Yakima Fruit &
Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108
(1972).
92. 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971).
93. ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.115(1).
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did not present the equal protection problem of section 893.155.
The Wisconsin court rejected the Arkansas, New Jersey and
Washington cases and adopted the rationale and the language
of Illinois and Hawaii decisions in finding the Wisconsin statute violative of equal protection of the laws. The opinion of
Justice Schaefer in Skinner v. Anderson,94 was quoted at length
by the Wisconsin court in relation to the central issue of
whether there were true differences to distinguish the
statutorily-favored classes from the unfavored:
[O]f all those whose negligence in connection with the construction of an improvement to real estate might result in
damage to property or injury to person four years after construction is completed, the statute singles out the architect
and the contractor, and grants them immunity. It is not at
all inconceivable that the owner or person in control of such
improvement might be held liable for damage or injury that
results from a defective condition for which the architect or
contractor is in fact responsible ...
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when
we consider that architects and contractors are not the only
persons whose negligence.

. .

may cause damage to property

or injury to persons. If, for example, four years after a building is completed a cornice should fall because the adhesive
was defective, the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no
immunity. .

.

. But if the cornice fell because of a defective

design or construction for which an architect or contractor
was responsible, immunity is granted. It cannot be said that
the one event is more likely than the other to occur within
four years after construction is completed. 5
Several paragraphs, to the same effect, were also quoted from
the Hawaii decision in Fujioka v. Kam.9"
In endorsing the Illinois and Hawaii opinions, rather than
those of Arkansas, New Jersey and Washington, the Wisconsin
court clearly followed the better reasoned and enlightened decisions. The Washington and Arkansas cases were completely
inadequate in their discussion of the equal protection issue.
97 simply stated
The Arkansas court, in Carter v. Hartenstein,
that there was a valid distinction between designers and occu94.
95.
96.
97.

38 1. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
66 Wis. 2d at 389, 390, 225 N.W.2d at 458, 459.
55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973).
248 Ark. 1096, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).

1976l

TERM OF THE COURT

piers or materialmen, but gave no indication of what that distinction was. In Yakima Fruit v. Central Heating,9 8 the Supreme Court of Washington distinguished Skinner v.
Anderson99 with a brief and inaccurate analysis' 0 and upheld
its statute on the ground that twenty states had enacted similar legislation, but only Illinois had by that time found its
statute to be unconstitutional.
The New Jersey court, in Rosenberg v. North Bergen,''
presented a lengthy discussion favoring the validity of its
recently-enacted statute of repose,10 2 but did not squarely face
the equal protection problem.' 3
The Wisconsin, Illinois and Hawaii opinions demonstrated,
however, that injury caused by the negligence of a designer or
architect is not more or less likely than harm caused by the
negligence of an occupier or materialman. Further, where the
negligence of a member of the protected class was the sole
proximate cause of harm, recovery against that party may be
barred, but the owner or occupier might still be subject to
liability. As the Wisconsin court recognized, a statute of limitations to protect those in the construction business might be
desirable, yet confinement of its protection to a limited class
cannot be justified.
Another statute of limitations problem was posed in Feest
v. Allis Chalmers Corp.' 4 When he was seventeen years of age,
98. 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
99. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).

100. The Washington court attempted to distinguish the Illinois limitation statute,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 24f (1963), from the Washington provision, Rev. Code Wash.
§ 4.16.300 et seq., by stating that the Illinois statute had been invalidated as being
special legislation in favor of only architects and contractors, but that the Washington
limitation applied to "any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement on real property." 503 P.2d at 111 (emphasis in original). The court ignored the
fact that the Illinois statute was applicable also to "any person" performing a similar

list of services, and that Rev. Code Wash. § 4.16.310 specifically excepted owners and
occupiers of land from protection of the statute of limitations at issue. The Skinner
court had indicated that exception of materialmen and owners and occupiers of land
from the protection of the Illinois statute was an important consideration in its finding
of constitutional invalidity.

101. 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1.
103. The court indicated that the legislature could reasonably grant special immunity to architects, designers and those responsible for construction when similar
immunities which those persons formerly enjoyed under common law were recently
abolished by court decision.
104. 68 Wis. 2d 760, 229 N.W.2d 651 (1975).
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the plaintiff was allegedly injured by a defect in farm machinery manufactured by the defendant. At the time of his injury
the Wisconsin age of majority was twenty-one. Approximately
two months before the plaintiff attained the age of twenty-one,
the age of majority was lowered to eighteen.' 5 The action in the
case at bar was commenced eleven months after plaintiff attained the age of twenty-one, and thirteen months after the
effective date of the Age of Majority Act.
The defendant sought and obtained summary judgment in
the trial court on the ground that the statute of limitations' 6
had run as to plaintiff's claim. The trial court found that the
plaintiff had one year from the effective date of the lowered age
of majority within which to commence action, and that the
action was barred by section 893.33, as amended.' 7 It was contended by the plaintiff, however, that the amendment to section 893.33 did not or should not apply to causes of action
which had accrued prior to the effective date of that amendment, and that he, the plaintiff, should have had one year from
his twenty-first birthday in which to bring suit.
In support of his argument on appeal, the plaintiff cited
sections 990.06 and 991.07 and Thorn v. Sensenbrenner.°8 The
statutes cited by the plaintiff provided that where a limitation
period had begun to run, subsequent legislative repeal of the
limitation period applied only to rights or remedies accruing
after the repeal had taken effect. The former limitation period
was to continue in effect as to a limitation period which had
previously begun to run unless the repealing act expressly provided otherwise, or unless another statutory rule was prescribed in a special case. Under the predecessor to section
990.06,109 the Wisconsin court in Thorn v. Sensenbrenner, held
105. Age of Majority Act, Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 213.
106. Wis. STAT. § 893.205 (1973).
107. Wis. STAT. § 893.33 (1973), as amended by the Age of Majority Act, provides
in pertinent part:
893.33. Persons under disability. If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter . . . be, at the time the cause of action accrued, .
(1) Within the age of 18 years; ...
(3) . . . the time of such disability is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action, except that the period within which the action
must be brought cannot be extended. . . in any case longer than one year after
the disability ceases.
108. 211 Wis. 208, 247 N.W. 870 (1933).
109. Wis. STAT. § 370.06 (1925).
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a legislative alteration of a limitation period inapplicable to a
plaintiff's existing cause of action.
The Thorn case was distinguished and sections 990.06 and
991.07 were held inapplicable, however, in the case at bar because the Age of Majority Act became effective prior to the
plaintiff's twenty-first birthday. In accord with Christie v.
Schwartz,I" the court held that the plaintiff's disability during
minority tolled the running of the statute of limitations, and
that the limitation period itself did not begin until disability
was removed by achievement of majority. The court ruled that
the statutes were, by their terms, applicable only to limitation
periods which had already begun to run at the time of repeal
or amendment of the statute of limitations involved. Since the
tolling period, rather than the limitation period, was in effect
at the time of amendment, sections 990.06 and 991.07 were held
to be of no avail to the plaintiff. Thus, even though the statute
of limitations was amended after the plaintiffs cause of action
accrued, he was not entitled to the benefit of the former limitation period.
The plaintiff still had, pursuant to section 893.33, one year
from removal of disability in which to bring action. Consistent
with previous Wisconsin criminal and juvenile delinquency
cases,"' the court held that the plaintiffs disability was relieved on the effective date of the Age of Majority Act. Even
though the act advanced the date after which the plaintiffs
claim would be barred, the legislation nevertheless provided a
reasonable time in which action could be commenced and was
2
therefore unobjectionable.1
JOHN

R.

DECKER

110. 49 Wis. 2d 760, 183 N.W.2d 81 (1971).
111. Truesdale v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 481, 210 N.W.2d 726 (1973); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Hershman, 55 Wis. 2d 499, 200 N.W.2d 65 (1972).
112. See Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 128 N.W. 2d 34 (1964);
Swanke v. Oneida County, 265 Wis. 92, 60 N.W.2d 756 (1953); Arnold v. Davis, 503
S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1973).

